


















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1356 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1356 
 








We build a simple theoretical model to understand why developing and transition economies 
have increasingly applied anti-dumping laws. To that end, we investigate the strategic 
incentives of oligopolistic exporting firms to undertake dumping in these economies. We 
show that dumping may be due to cross-country differences in income, to the extent of tariff 
protection and to the exchange rate depreciations observed recently. Dumping may arise even 
if consumers exhaust all arbitrage possibilities. 
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Times have changed in the world of anti-dumping activities. While anti-dumping actions were
only used by major industrial countries less then a decade ago, they are now the trade policy of
choice of developing and transition economies as well. On a worldwide basis, India has since 2001
overtaken the US in terms of initiations of new anti-dumping cases. In terms of cases per dollar
of imports, India’s intensity of anti-dumping use is seven times the US ﬁgure, though this is less
than Argentina’s intensity, which is 20 times the US number (Finger, Ng and Wangchuk, 2000).
Noting that most anti-dumping investigations against Member States of the European Community
emanate from countries like China, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, India, Russia, etc., the European
Community concludes: “Anti-dumping is now a global instrument and every country is now both
a potential user and potential target of anti-dumping action” (EC, 2002, p.1).
A natural question that arises from these observations is what are the conditions that lead to
dumping. In recent years, a number of theoretical models have been developed to examine the ex-
port behavior of ﬁrms under diﬀerent market structures. The survey by Blonigen and Prusa (2003)
thoroughly reviews the existing theory and empirics and describes the various market outcomes of
resulting anti-dumping actions. The existing literature largely conﬁnes attention to outcomes of
anti-dumping laws in developed countries. However, dumping by Western ﬁrms is also observed
in industries of developing and transition economies whose economic characteristics are diﬀerent.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the strategic incentives of oligopolistic exporting ﬁrms to
undertake dumping in poorer countries and to understand why the latter have increasingly applied
anti-dumping laws. We shall focus on several important factors that inﬂuence ﬁrms’ export be-
havior: a product quality gap, countries’ diﬀerences in size and income, tariﬀ schedules, and the
exchange rate.
Though developing and transition economies diﬀer in many respects, there are a number of
common economic characteristics that have inspired our framework of analysis:
² A limited concern for quality standards has often driven ﬁrms in these economies to supply
goods whose quality is inferior to that of Western ﬁrms. This is established in a number of
empirical studies that show a quality advantage of imports over exports by comparing average
unit values (Aturupane et al., 1999; Lankhuizen, 2000).
² There is also convincing evidence that a signiﬁcant proportion of trade involves trade of
vertically diﬀerentiated goods (Greenaway et al., 1994, 1995).
2² The current nominal protection rates reveal high levels of tariﬀ protection, from two to three
times those of industrial countries (see the World Bank website).
² Trends in nominal exchange rates indicate a tendency towards depreciation and show ﬂuctu-
ations in currencies that are often larger than the applied tariﬀ rates. Examples include the
Russian Ruble and the Argentinian Peso.
² It is common that anti-dumping cases involve just two players, a local producer and a foreign
exporter. This observation derives from anti-dumping proceedings of the US and the EC. For
example, petitions which are ﬁled by US industries against imports concern products which
are usually classiﬁed under 10-digit subheadings of the Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule of the
United States. Even in a large trading nation like the US, sources of supply at this level of
disaggregation concern a few ﬁrms only. See, for example, USITC (2001, 2002).
The speciﬁc model we analyse is as follows. We model bilateral international trade by con-
sidering the market for a single (quality-diﬀerentiated) product in a two-country world, home
and foreign. Domestic and foreign consumers have heterogenous preferences for the sole product
attribute, namely, quality. The distribution of consumer preferences is diﬀerent in that foreign
consumers have more sophisticated tastes. Also, as consumers may decide not to consume, mar-
ket sizes at both locations are endogenous. Quality development is costly and the foreign ﬁrm is
assumed to be more eﬃcient with regard to quality development costs. In this environment, two
types of quality are produced under free trade, the most eﬃcient ﬁrm having the quality leadership.
Trade takes the form of intra-industry trade in vertically diﬀerentiated goods whose determinants
relate to those found traditionally in the empirical literature (see Greenaway et al., 1994, 1995).
However, free trade does not lead to a social optimum (in a second-best sense) and governments in
both countries have incentives to impose an optimal trade policy.
The main result of this paper is that dumping is a natural strategy of ﬁrms in the sense that
it always takes place. Dumping arises as a consequence of diﬀerences in the distribution of tastes
across countries engaged in trade. The foreign ﬁrm may unilaterally dump into the poorer country
or vice versa; reciprocal dumping may also occur, a necessary condition being that at least one of
the countries involved in trade levies a positive tariﬀ on imports.
Another result we derive is that as free trade is not optimal, the strategic incentive to dump may
be the result of tariﬀ protection imposed by both countries in the ﬁrst place. In particular, reciprocal
dumping is more likely the higher the import tariﬀs. Moreover, as exchange rate movements aﬀect
3ﬁrms in opposite directions, an exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) increases the likelihood
of unilateral dumping in the domestic (foreign) market.
We ﬁnally explore whether dumping can still arise if consumers exhaust arbitrage possibilities
via parallel trade. We ﬁnd that if market conditions lead to reciprocal dumping, there is no gain to
be derived from the re-shipment of goods. Under unilateral dumping, there are gains from arbitrage
but if tariﬀ rates are positive dumping by the foreign ﬁrm occurs even if all arbitrage possibilities
are exhausted.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we lay out the general structure and describe the
international trade game. In section 3, we derive the market equilibrium and obtain the conditions
for dumping. We also outline the eﬀects of changes in the exchange rate level on dumping. In
section 4, we discuss a game between governments which simultaneously decide whether or not to
impose tariﬀs to maximize national welfare. Section 5 discusses the implications of arbitrage of
goods on unilateral and reciprocal dumping. We conclude in section 6. The appendix contains a
glossary of symbols.
2 The Model
We analyze dumping in the context of markets in two countries, which we shall call domestic and
foreign, the latter denoted by “ ¤ ”. The domestic country is meant to represent a developing
or transition economy; the foreign country a developed economy. Suppose that a population of






µq ¡ p if she buys a unit of a product of quality q at price p
0 otherwise
(1)
Consumers buy at most one unit. We assume the consumer-speciﬁc quality taste parameter µ is




;µ > 0: Preferences of foreign consumers are also given
by (1) but we allow for a population of measure m¤(m¤ ¸ 1) to live abroad and for the foreign




;¸¤ > 1: Tirole (1988) shows








, higher incomes are observed in the foreign country if ¸¤ > 1: In our
framework, ¸¤ is therefore a measure of the diﬀerence in incomes across countries.
4We assume there are two ﬁrms, one in each country. Let q and q` denote the quality produced
by the home ﬁrm to be sold at home and abroad respectively. Likewise, let q¤ and q¤
h denote the
quality produced by the foreign ﬁrm to be sold locally and abroad respectively. Following Eaton
and Schmitt (1994), we introduce production ﬂexibility in this model by assuming that ﬁrms ﬁrst
develop one basic product, and then produce variations on these basic products at a lower or no
cost. Firms incur ﬁxed costs of quality development; ﬂexibility amounts to assuming cost functions
of the form: C (q;q`) = cmaxfq;q`g
2 =2 and C¤ (q¤;q¤
h) = c¤ maxfq¤;q¤
hg
2 =2: As c and c¤ are
expressed in diﬀerent currencies, let us introduce e, the forward exchange rate given to the ﬁrms
deﬁned as the domestic currency price of foreign currency.1 We assume c > ec¤, that is, the foreign
ﬁrm is more eﬃcient than the domestic ﬁrm in producing any quality level. We normalize the
marginal costs of production to zero.
Given these assumptions, Moraga-Gonz´ alez and Viaene (2004) show that it is optimal for an
individual ﬁrm to sell the same level of quality abroad and locally, i.e., q¤ = q¤
h; and q = q`: A
second useful result is that the foreign ﬁrm will manufacture a product of higher quality than the
domestic ﬁrm’s one, i.e., q¤
h > q`; this result follows from an application of the risk-dominance
selection criterion of Harsany and Selten (1988) and hinges upon the fact that the foreign ﬁrm is
more eﬃcient than the local ﬁrm.2
On the basis of these results, in what follows, we shall derive proﬁts functions with two qualities,
low quality q` and high quality q¤
h: We start by deriving domestic demands for both variants. Deﬁne
ﬁrst the corresponding prices charged in the domestic economy by p and p¤
h; respectively, with
p¤
h > p. Denote by e µ the buyer who is indiﬀerent between high quality or low quality. From (1),
it follows that e µ = (p¤
h ¡ p)=(q¤
h ¡ q`). Denote by b µ, the consumer indiﬀerent between acquiring
low quality or nothing. From (1), we get b µ = p=ql. As we have identiﬁed two consumers that are
indiﬀerent at the margin, we know that the high-quality good is demanded by those consumers
such that e µ · µ · µ and the low-quality good by those consumers such that b µ · µ < e µ: Consumers















1The forward exchange rate remains ﬁxed over the time horizon during which product quality is selected.
2Motta et al. (1997) also use this criterion to select amongst equilibria in a context where countries diﬀer in the
sophistication of demand and ﬁrms ﬁrst operate in autarky and then under free trade. Diﬀerences in consumer tastes
inﬂuence ﬁrms’ choice of qualities under autarky, which in turn play a selection role when trade opens up. See also
Cabrales and Motta (2001).
5Note that domestic demand Dh of high quality is met by imports from the foreign ﬁrm at the
price p¤
h: Foreign demands for both variants are obtained in a similar way. First denote p` and p¤ as
the price of low quality and of high quality charged in the foreign market, respectively, and recall
























Note that foreign demand D¤
` of low quality is met by imports from the domestic ﬁrm at the
price p`:
We study a three-stage game. First, the domestic government and the foreign government
choose a trade policy to maximize national welfare. The trade policy stage consists of the simul-
taneous announcement of an ad valorem tariﬀ rate on imports; we denote these tariﬀs by t and t¤
respectively. While governments can choose the height of tariﬀ protection, it is assumed that they
cannot determine the exchange rate. In the second stage, ﬁrms select simultaneously their quality
levels and incur the ﬁxed costs of quality development. In the third stage, ﬁrms select their prices.
We solve the model by backward induction.
3 Conditions for Dumping
We now proceed to derive the equilibrium outcome in stage 3 taking (i) any proﬁle of quality
choices (q`;q¤
h), (ii) trade policies (t; t¤) and (iii) the exchange rate as given. Using the derived
domestic demands in (2), foreign demands in (3) and cost functions, the problem of the domestic
ﬁrm is to select prices p and p` so as to maximize proﬁts:






where p`(1 ¡ t¤) is the international price of low-quality exports and to convert it into domestic
currency we multiply it by the exchange rate e. Likewise, the decision problem of the foreign ﬁrm
is to ﬁnd p¤ and p¤













h(1 ¡ t) is the international price of foreign ﬁrm’s high-quality exports and by dividing by
the exchange rate foreign export receipts are converted into foreign currency. Solving the pair of






























Equilibrium prices depend on qualities and on the primitive parameters ¸¤ and µ: They are such
that pp¤ = p`p¤
h; that is the product of domestic prices is equal to the product of export prices.
We now examine ﬁrms’ second-stage decisions: the quality selection. In this stage ﬁrms take (i)
trade policies (t;t¤) and (ii) the exchange rate as given and, anticipating the equilibrium prices of
the continuation game obtained in (6) and (7), select the quality of their products. The domestic
ﬁrm selects q` to maximize reduced-form proﬁts:



























Deﬁne ¹ as the quality gap between ﬁrm’s product quality, ¹ = q¤
h=q` > 1: The ratio of ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to qualities can be written as:
¹2(4¹ ¡ 7)





(1 ¡ t) + e¸¤m¤
1 + e¸¤m¤(1 ¡ t¤)
¶
(10)
This equation gives the equilibrium measure of product diﬀerentiation ¹ as an implicit function
of relative costs in same currency units, ad valorem tariﬀs and the primitive parameters of the
model. Since the LHS of (10) is monotonically increasing in ¹, and the RHS is a strictly positive

















From 10 it is clear that an equilibrium exists if ¹ > 7=4: The signs reported in (11) give the
relationship between the equilibrium quality gap ¹ and the primitive parameters of the model, as
well as countries’ tariﬀ rates. For example, if the exchange rate increases, the equilibrium degree
of product diﬀerentiation falls.
7Knowing ¹ and using the reaction functions in qualities, we can derive the market equilibrium





































4µ(¸¤m¤ + (1 ¡ t)=e)
c¤
¹(4¹2 ¡ 3¹ + 2)
(4¹ ¡ 1)3
A ﬁrst characteristic of the market equilibrium is that the quality gap ¹ is also measure of price








An increase in product diﬀerentiation decreases therefore price competition in both markets. The
reason for this outcome is that in the presence of international trade ﬁrms consider the world as a
single market and choose their quality to maximize global proﬁts. Second, the equilibrium exhibits
intra-industry trade in vertically diﬀerentiated goods. The quantities D¤
` and Dh represent domestic
exports of low-quality products and domestic imports of the high-quality variant, respectively. The


















When measured at international prices, the GL index in values depends on ¸¤, m¤ and, via ¹, on
the rest of parameters of the model.
The determination of dumping relies on three principles. First, domestic and export goods must
be “like” products. The term “like” product means alike in all respects or having characteristics
8closely resembling those of the product under consideration. In practise, though quality diﬀerentia-
tion is discussed in investigations, it hardly leads to a classiﬁcation of low-quality and high-quality
goods in diﬀerent industries. Second, a local ﬁrm may petition the government for relief if dumped
imports materially injure the competing domestic ﬁrm. In the market equilibrium just obtained,
domestic and foreign demands are such that the foreign ﬁrm’s market share is two thirds of the
domestic market and the domestic ﬁrm’s share in the foreign market is one third. It is clear that
both proportions are large enough to justify injury. Third, a product is to be considered as being
dumped if its export price to a particular country is less than a “normal value.”
The WTO provides two main methods to calculate a product’s “normal value.” The ﬁrst one
is a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs and normal proﬁt
margins. The second, and most frequently used, method is based on the price in the exporter’s
domestic market (see the WTO website). These two deﬁnitions of dumping are implemented in
turn, each leading to a diﬀerent proposition.3
Proposition 1 When “normal value” is based on total average costs, then: (i) there is no dumping
by the low-quality ﬁrm (for realistic values of t¤); (ii) the high-quality ﬁrm dumps in the developing
economy if
2(1 + m¤)
1 + e¸¤m¤=(1 ¡ t)
<
4¹2 ¡ 3¹ + 2
4¹2 ¡ 5¹ + 1
(14)
where ¹ is the solution to (10).
Proof. (i) There is dumping by the domestic ﬁrm abroad if pl(1 ¡ t¤)e < cq2
l =(2(Dl + D¤
l )):
Substituting the expressions obtained in the market equilibrium, this is the case if
2e(1 ¡ t¤)¸¤(1 + m¤)
1 + e(1 ¡ t¤)¸¤ <
4¹2 ¡ 7¹
4¹2 ¡ 5¹ + 1
(15)
which cannot hold for two reasons. First, the RHS of (15) is less than 1. Second, the LHS of
(15) is greater than 1 as long as (1 ¡ 1=(e¸¤(1 + 2m¤)) > t¤; since ¸¤ and m¤ are greater than 1
and, typically, e is large and t¤ small, this inequality holds. (ii) There is dumping by the foreign
ﬁrm in the domestic economy if p¤
h(1 ¡ t)=e < c¤q¤2
h =(2(D¤
h + Dh)): After substitution, one obtains
condition (14). ¥
The high-quality ﬁrm derives its proﬁts from its own market but tries to recoup part of the
development costs by exporting. As the export market is poorer, a low export price is charged.
3The theoretical literature has also used the competing local price of imports as a proxy for the normal value
(Vandenbussche and Wauthy, 2001). In terms of our model, such a comparison is done in terms of hedonic prices as
it concerns goods of diﬀerent qualities. The result is that only dumping by the low-quality ﬁrm is observed.
9Another observation has to do with the presence of the home tariﬀ rate in (14). Dumping is
believed to be intimately related to the existence of international tariﬀ policies. As we have seen
already, an important characteristic of developing and transition economies is the high levels of
duties imposed on imports. It is argued that high import tariﬀs have the perverse eﬀect of forcing
a foreign company to dump in order to enter a market, subjecting itself to anti-dumping actions.
This view has been repeatedly put forward by various international organizations and governments
(see for example, EC (2003)). Condition (14) examines the theoretical premises of such conjecture.
It is clear that the tariﬀ rate is instrumental in determining the likelihood of dumping by the foreign
ﬁrm into the domestic market: an increase in t decreases the LHS of (14) and, since the RHS of
(14) is decreasing in ¹; it increases the RHS of (14).
We now turn to the standard deﬁnition of dumping: when the export price to a particular
country is less than the price the ﬁrm normally charges on its own market. Then:
Proposition 2 Under the WTO standard, (i) dumping by the foreign ﬁrm in the domestic market
occurs if ¸¤ > (1 ¡ t)=e; (ii) dumping by the domestic ﬁrm abroad takes place if ¸¤ < 1=(1 ¡ t¤)e;







As a result, unilateral dumping always occurs, while reciprocal dumping can only arise if tariﬀ rates
are strictly positive.
Proof. (i) This is the case if the international foreign currency price of high-quality exports is
less than the local price, i.e. p¤
h(1 ¡ t)=e < p¤: Using (7), this implies (1 ¡ t)=e < ¸¤: (ii) This is
the case if ep`(1 ¡ t¤) < p; which using (6) implies ¸¤ < 1=(1 ¡ t¤)e: (iii) This result follows from
combining the previous two inequalities. ¥
Proposition 2 leads to a number of observations:
² First, dumping is a natural price strategy of ﬁrms because it always takes place (irrespective
of whether domestic tariﬀs are zero or positive).
² Second, traditional treatments of dumping have obtained conditions for reciprocal dumping
based on transportation costs in an international duopoly (Brander and Krugman, 1983) and
conditions for unilateral and reciprocal dumping based on transportation costs in an interna-
tional oligopoly (Weinstein, 1992). Diﬀerently, condition (16) demonstrates that unilateral or
10reciprocal dumping arises when the cross-country diﬀerence in incomes falls within or outside
an interval created by the exchange rate and the domestic and foreign tariﬀ rates.
The role of exchange rate changes on the extent of dumping is clariﬁed in the following corollary
of Proposition 2:
Corollary. A depreciation of the domestic currency (increase in e) increases the likelihood of
dumping by the foreign ﬁrm in the domestic market and decreases the likelihood of dumping by the
domestic ﬁrm abroad.
This result follows directly from (16) and emphasizes the fact that exchange rate movements
aﬀect ﬁrms in opposite directions. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the exchange rate e increases
the gap between the international foreign currency price of high-quality and the local price abroad
while it decreases the diﬀerence between the domestic currency price of low-quality exports and
the domestic price.4
4 Trade Policies
In the ﬁrst stage of the game each government chooses a tariﬀ rate to maximize social welfare. As
mentioned above, solutions for t and t¤ are useful in determining whether unilateral or reciprocal
dumping can arise in equilibrium. Also, if it is unilateral, which of the two ﬁrms is likely to dump
its products.
In each country, social welfare (W) equals the unweighted sum of domestic consumer surplus





(µqh ¡ ph)dF(µ) +
Z ˜ µ
ˆ µ
(µq` ¡ p`)dF(µ) (17)




2(4¹ ¡ 1)2 q` (18)
The proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm are:
¼ = µ
·
1 + e(1 ¡ t¤)¸¤m¤
2
¸
(4¹3 ¡ 3¹2 + 2¹)
(4¹ ¡ 1)3 q` (19)
4It is important to note that the corollary deals with the eﬀects of exchange rate changes on the likelihood of
dumping. This diﬀers from the empirical literature which focus on econometric estimates of exchange rate changes
on the number of anti-dumping ﬁlings (see e.g. Feinberg, 1989; Knetter and Prusa, 2003).




(4¹ ¡ 1)2 q` (20)
Adding these three expressions we obtain the reduced-form expression for domestic social welfare:
W = q` ¢ A(t;t¤;¸¤;m¤;µ;¹(¢)) (21)
where A(:) collects terms (other than q`) of the components of social welfare:
A(t;t¤;¸¤;m¤;µ;¹(¢)) =
µ¹2(4¹ + 5)
2(4¹ ¡ 1)2 +
µ(1 + e(1 ¡ t¤)¸¤m¤)
2
(4¹3 ¡ 3¹2 + 2¹)
(4¹ ¡ 1)3 +
4µt¹2(¹ ¡ 1)
(4¹ ¡ 1)2 :
An expression for foreign social welfare can be obtained following the same steps:
W¤ = q` ¢ A¤(t;t¤;¸¤;m¤;µ;¹(¢)) (22)
Though both welfare levels are proportional to q`; the factors of proportionality are diﬀerent
and such that A¤(¢) > A(¢) under free trade (t = t¤ = 0): The main reason is that foreign proﬁts
derived from high-quality production are much higher than those the domestic ﬁrm derives from
low-quality production: e¼¤=¼ = 16c=ec¤: Note that domestic welfare W is aﬀected by t in two
ways. First, it enters directly into the expression for A(¢) because of its rent-extracting eﬀect of
foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts; second it indirectly aﬀects competitive conditions at home and abroad through
¹ (see (11)). Similarly, t¤ captures rents from the domestic ﬁrm and alters the competitiveness of
the international market.
Let us denote the right hand side of (10) as the relative development cost r and consider the
following elasticities ® = (@W=@¹)(¹=W) > 0; ¯ = (@¹=@r)(r=¹) > 0 and ° = (@A=@t)(t=A) > 0;
also ®¤ = (@W¤=@¹)(¹=W¤) > 0 and °¤ = (@A¤=@t¤)(t¤=A¤) > 0: Then, in an interior equilibrium









1 + e¸¤m¤(1 ¡ t¤)
= 0
This leads the following result.











(ii) Moreover t > t¤ if and only if ®¤¯ > °¤:
Part (i) indicates that while it is optimal for the domestic government to levy a tariﬀ, the
foreign policymaker may subsidize low-quality imports. Intuitively, when the value of high-quality
imports is large, it pays the domestic government to extract positive rents. In contrast, the value of
low-quality imports being small, the rent extraction eﬀect of a foreign tariﬀ is small and the foreign
government may ﬁnd it optimal to subsidize imports to reduce the quality gap ¹ and increase
competition in its local market. Regarding condition (16), setting t¤ < 0 or t¤ = 0 excludes
reciprocal dumping and allows for dumping by the foreign ﬁrm in the domestic market only. Part
(ii) of the proposition gives some explanation for the observed diﬀerence in tariﬀ rates between
developed and developing economies.
An interior subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the simultaneous solution to (10), (23) and
(24). For example when countries’ size and income diﬀerences as well as ﬁrms’ cost asymmetries
are negligible, the numerical solution to this system of equations reveals that the equilibrium tariﬀ
t¤ imposed by the foreign government is positive but very close to zero, while the equilibrium tariﬀ
t levied by the domestic government is about 64%. The simulations show that as asymmetries
between the countries increase, t increases while t¤ decreases.
5 Arbitrage and dumping
So far we have assumed that consumers cannot arbitrage. This is a reasonable assumption in
settings where transaction costs associated to the reselling of goods are of suﬃcient magnitude to
render parallel trade unproﬁtable. In this section we examine whether our conditions for dumping
are aﬀected by goods arbitrage. Our ﬁrst result establishes a condition under which no gain from
arbitrage is obtained.







Proof. Resale of high-quality goods from the domestic country to the foreign country is not
proﬁtable if p¤
h > e(1¡t¤)p¤. Using (7), this implies ¸¤ < 1=(1¡t¤)e: This condition also guarantees
13that consumers at home do not gain by buying low-quality goods from the home ﬁrm and exporting
them in turn to the foreign country. Re-shipment of low-quality goods from the foreign to the
domestic country does not occur if pl > p(1 ¡ t)=e. Using (7), this implies ¸¤ > (1 ¡ t)=e: This
condition also ensures that foreign consumers do not beneﬁt from parallel exporting high quality.
¥
The condition for unproﬁtable arbitrage possibilities in (25) is similar to that for reciprocal
dumping in (16). As a result, pricing policies of ﬁrms are such that when reciprocal dumping
occurs no incentive for parallel trading exists.
According to Proposition 4, arbitrage possibilities arise if condition (25) is not fulﬁlled. Since
this condition can only be violated in one direction, two-way arbitrage is generally excluded, except
for speciﬁc values of t and t¤; in particular satisfying (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ t¤) = 1. Since one-way arbitrage
is possible, the question is whether dumping can still be observed when consumers exhaust all
arbitrage possibilities. The next result indicates that it depends on the height of import tariﬀs in
both countries.
Proposition 5 (a) Let ¸¤ ¸ 1=(1 ¡ t¤)e. Then if (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ t¤) < 1 dumping by the foreign
ﬁrm arises even if consumers exhaust all arbitrage possibilities for high-quality goods. Otherwise, if
(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ t¤) ¸ 1; arbitrage prevents dumping by the foreign ﬁrm. (b) Let ¸¤ · 1=(1 ¡ t¤)e: Then
if (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ t¤) < 1 dumping by the domestic ﬁrm arises even if consumers exhaust all arbitrage
possibilities for low-quality goods. Otherwise, if (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ t¤) ¸ 1; arbitrage prevents dumping by
the domestic ﬁrm.
Proof. (a) Suppose ¸¤ ¸ 1=(1 ¡ t¤)e: Since ¸¤ = p`=p = p¤=p¤
h; domestic consumers gain from
reselling low-quality and high-quality goods. If consumers exhaust all arbitrage possibilities, it
must be the case that p¤
h = e(1 ¡ t¤)p¤ and that p = e(1 ¡ t¤)p`: Or ¸¤ = 1=(1 ¡ t¤)e: Dumping of
high quality goods arises if p¤
h(1¡t)=e < p¤; or if ¸¤ > (1¡t)=e: Combining the two conditions on
¸¤ yields the result. (b) The proof is similar and, to save space, omitted. ¥
6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the question why developing and transition economies have increasingly
enacted anti-dumping laws in the last few years. We have found that governments in transition
and developing economies have strong incentives to levy tariﬀs on high-quality imports because
14of its substantial rent-extracting eﬀects. This trade policy has, however, two additional eﬀects.
First, it aﬀects the pricing behavior of exporting ﬁrms and increases the likelihood of unilateral
and reciprocal dumping. Second, it renders the arbitrage of goods, through parallel trade and the
re-shipment of exports, ineﬀective in the sense that it does not prevent dumping by the foreign ﬁrm.
These two observations explain why these countries have enacted anti-dumping laws to counteract
the eﬀects of their trade policies. The next step is to analyze anti-dumping policy. Hopefully the
analysis above oﬀers a useful framework within which the analysis of anti-dumping instruments can
be conducted.
157 Appendix: Glossary of Symbols
c;c¤ domestic, foreign quality development cost (in own currency)
CS domestic consumer surplus
D`;D¤
` domestic, foreign demand for low quality
Dh;D¤
h domestic, foreign demand for high quality
e forward exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency)
GL Grubel-Lloyd index
m¤ population size abroad (m¤ ¸ 1)
p domestic currency price of low-quality consumption
p¤ foreign currency price of high-quality consumption
p` foreign currency price of low-quality exports
p¤
h domestic currency price of high-quality exports
q` low quality (produced at home only)
q¤
h high quality (produced abroad only)
r relative development cost
R domestic tariﬀ revenues
t domestic ad valorem tariﬀ rate (t ? 0)
t¤ foreign ad valorem tariﬀ rate (t¤ ? 0)
W domestic social welfare
W¤ foreign social welfare
µ;µ¤ domestic, foreign taste parameter
µ highest taste parameter observed at home
b µ consumer indiﬀerent between low quality or no purchase
e µ consumer indiﬀerent between high and low quality
¸¤ relative taste parameter (¸ > 1)
¹ quality gap (q¤
h=q`)
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